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This article sets out to reflect critically on the object of study in media and 
communication studies. It argues that not only the conventional analytical 
categories but also the modes of explanation and interpretation used are both 
problematic and Eurocentric, because they are mediated by a whole series of 
industrial and intellectual practices which have remained unacknowledged. The 
article aims to show how taking media–related practices as an object of study, 
requires radical revision to much of media studies. Central among these practices 
is commentary of various kinds. The mass media spend much time commenting on 
themselves and one another, just as research through questionnaires, focus groups 
and interviews are invitations to participants to comment. Commenting in its many 
forms emerges therefore as an important way of indicating how articulation, a 
central concept in media and cultural studies, works. Drawing on examples from 
Indonesia, an analysis of commentary provides a way of understanding how 
audiences relate to media production, not least because people talk about the mass 
media and how they are implicated, or perhaps even disarticulated by the media. In 
failing to appreciate how commentary works, media scholars are complicit in this 
process of disarticulation, a notion elaborated in the article. 
 
 
In the summer of 1997, I was involved in a number of conversations with a group of Balinese villagers 
about how contemporary mass media was affecting their lives – a topic upon which people wax lyrical. 
One evening the discussion took an interesting turn. Let me give brief extracts.i 
 
An Ex-Village 
Headman: 
If you ask my opinion, if things carry on for a long time like this. Our 
grandchildren will be in difficulties, if there isn’t – what do you call it?... 
An Old Actor: Turmoil. If there isn’t turmoil, so that everything starts afresh… 
Self: What do you mean by ‘turmoil’? 
Actor: It is everything turned upside down, destruction. 
Self: But what’s the use of a war? 
Ex-Head: Its use is that everything starts all over again. After a fresh beginning 
things are ordered again... You can’t get, as you do now, people 
‘buffaloing’. 
Self: What’s ‘buffaloing’? 
Ex-Head: It’s a proverb: those who are already too big just get bigger. Ordinary 
people can do nothing. 
Actor: It’s already too late. They can’t lift a finger. 
Ex-Head: For example, they’re like tiny insects, they count for nothing. Even if I 
spoke up and said this or that, no one would pay any attention. 
Actor: The poor are useless. No one believes them. The rich never think of 
actually talking with the poor. If possible, they keep as far away from them 
as they can, where the rich can talk among themselves about whatever. I 
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don’t think that the poor could succeed in speaking. Even if they did, they 
are worth nothing, no one is listening. 
Ex-Head: They show the good life on television. They provide images of beautiful 
things, so that those without will strive for them. The only problem is that 
they can’t succeed. 
Actor: They haven’t the wherewithal. 
Ex-Head: Yes, it’s hard. Why? You can say people these days, it’s like 
advertisements. Why should government promote television the whole time 
and only broadcast what comes across as good? But what’s bad is not, or is 
rarely, shown. The theory is fine... 
Actor: But the practice is a very far cry from that. 
Ex-Head: The practice is rotten. It is tantalizing the masses, goading them on, so that 
they will want to slave away. 
Actor: So that they’ll be joyful, for example so that they will do what they’re told 
is right. 
Ex-Head: Yes. But afterwards there is the practice, which is different. For example, 
consider people going on transmigration programmes. They never show 
transmigrants starving. It’s always people who... 
Actor: Who are happy. 
Young Dancer: ‘Successful’! 
Ex-Head: Just the ones who have made it. A lot of people have been duped that way. 
 
 Among the points the commentators made were that serious unrest was not just impending, but 
necessary to rectify the excessive inequalities between people. The relationship between the élite and 
ordinary people had broken down irremediably. There was no connection between the political rhetoric 
and images disseminated on television and how the élite operated in practice. The poor were not just 
dispossessed, but had been rendered inarticulate. Mass communication, on this account, was mass 
miscommunication and the silencing of the masses.  
 When I wrote the original analysis of these conversations for a collection on the impact of 
globalization in Bali in the late twentieth century (Hobart 1999a), it was politely received and put as 
the last chapter, a sort of appendix to the more serious matters of Bali’s place in contemporary 
Indonesia. After all, what did the musings of a few Balinese villagers really add up to? As the volume 
was going to press a year later, the riots in Indonesia happened which led to the fall of Suharto and the 
New Order régime. So the publishers suddenly became anxious for more details. What the 
commentators had to say was no longer a mere ethnographic curiosity: they had predicted what the 
mass media and most serious intellectual authorities had failed to. Moreover, these villagers had 
anticipated much of the subsequent media commentary within Indonesia and abroad, which relegates 
the vast majority of the population as ‘masses’ or ‘the poor’, who have to be spoken for because they 
are – or, rather, have been rendered – inarticulate. 
 
Why Anthropology? 
The problem of how to imagine, study and engage with ‘the masses’ in mass media takes us straight to 
a constitutive problem in media studies. Namely it is not a single discipline, but a site of contestation 
among diverse approaches across the human sciences, which reveals the incompatibility between them. 
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The conjunction of media and communications studies disguises inherent antagonisms, which split 
many academic departments.  
For convenience, we may trace the emergence of mass communications studies to the post-World 
War II period, when the European model of empire was being supplanted by the American dream of a 
modern consumer society. The imperative of communicating the message of modernity and how to 
achieve it engaged the obvious, and appropriately positivistic, disciplines of sociology and psychology. 
They drew upon a muscular, realistic-sounding and so convincing rhetoric from political economy, 
which neatly, but not accidentally, dove-tailed with the agendas of western governments and 
corporations. It was in part in opposition to this triumphalist grand narrative of the new American 
imperium that cultural and media studies developed in post-imperial Britain to question these myths of 
capital and power. As much a series of intellectual arguments informed by post-Gramscian thinking 
and punctuated by formative ruptures as it was a conventional ‘discipline’ (Hall 1996), cultural studies, 
with a distinctive culturalist turn, and its empirical or ethnographic off-shoot, media studies, attracted 
attention from feminism and literary criticism inter alia. Cultural anthropology, which thought that it 
owned the franchise on ‘culture’, has largely stayed aloof and indeed ignorant of what was happening, 
apart from a handful of anthropologists who recognized the climactic change going on.ii How have all 
these different disciplines, each with distinct intellectual histories, formative debates, presuppositions 
and ways of conducting business, co-existed and contributed to a broader understanding of mass media 
around the world at this gargantuan intellectual fest? 
 Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging that the mass media comprise so complex, diverse and 
changing a congeries of institutions, practices and human subjects as to be beyond the scope of any 
single approach, human scientists have mostly settled back to doing what they do best – coincidentally 
reminiscent of Orientalist accounts of Hindu-Buddhist kings. That is they have dreamed up scenarios in 
which they (and their disciplines) are sovereign, a source of enlightenment and central to the known 
world, while all others are subordinate, marginal or irrelevant. One discipline however positions itself 
as dominant. In effect the late-comers, the culturalists, literary critics and feminists, constitute 
oppositional voices to the entrenched mass communication specialists. Significantly, the rival 
theoretical positions reflect deep divisions in the history of philosophy of the human sciences 
themselves. Mass communications appeals to a vision of social science, which aims to replicate the 
rigour of theory and method of the natural sciences. The language is of facts, testing hypotheses and 
methodologies, which is attractive to governments, corporations and funding bodies who want to be 
able to present the world as tidy, measurable and so knowable, and under control.  
 The problem is this vision of natural science is a nineteenth-century idealization of both the nature 
of theory and scientific practice, as philosophers and historians of science have long noted. It is with 
the shortcomings of attempts to scientize the complexity, diversity, historicity and even contingency of 
media practice that alternative approaches have taken issue. As the philosophical arguments upon 
which these approaches draw is precisely the later critique of hegemonic naturalism, it is hardly 
unsurprising that the outcome is antagonistic. While cultural and media studies scholars like to present 
themselves as the radical vanguard, ironically, as Chen Kuan-Hsing has pointed out (1996), they in turn 
have extraordinary difficulty in seriously engaging with more radical French post-structuralism. 
 Where does anthropology come into all this? If we recognize that, realistically, no single discipline 
can adequately encompass so widespread and general a phenomenon as the mass media, then 
anthropologists are potentially qualified to contribute in several ways. The one which concerns me here 
is with rethinking the object of study. 
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 Political economic and sociological macro-models were never designed to address production, 
distribution or reception treated as practices, nor the lived daily worlds of journalists, broadcasters, 
readers or viewers, nor the complex social contexts in which the media work. In short ‘the mass media’ 
are essentialized out of a gamut of media-related practices, which remain effectively unstudied. While 
macro-level analyses of global and national media industries may provide useful descriptions, they are 
largely unempirical and mediated. That is they are high level and potentially problematic abstractions 
from observable practice. Crucially they involve intermediate objects – for example ‘the average’ 
(Hacking 1990) in order even to start imagining audiences (hence the legendary problems of ‘audience 
studies’). In a serious sense, the economy, the polity, media industries, globalization, indeed the entire 
vocabulary of mass communication is itself mediated, because such terms are not natural entities but 
the products of, and inextricable from, innumerable acts of commentary by politicians, industrialists, 
financiers, media commentators and academics. With such questionable objects of study (far removed 
from the paradigms of the natural sciences), no wonder incantations about methodology are wheeled in 
to cover the epistemological incoherence. And to study media without recognizing the mediated nature 
of the inquiry and its objects of study is circular. 
 Two questions follow. The first is how might we avoid the potentially vicious circularity which 
besets human scientific inquiry, about which scholars as different as Foucault (1970) and Habermas 
(1987) concur? Reflexivity has its limits, because the criteria of judgement are themselves wrapped up 
in the ‘methodology’. The notion of critical, or ethnographic, understanding offers one possible way 
forward. The second issue, which will occupy much of this piece, is the relevance of a missing object 
of study – commentary. 
 Ethnography by participant-observation is often trumpeted as anthropology’s main contribution to 
the human sciences. Considered as a practice, it is obvious though that, however brilliant and deep the 
insights, ethnography is inevitably something of a glorious muddle, not some methodological solution. 
The value of ethnography is, I suggest, quite different. Growing out of the long-term implication in 
some other people’s ways of living, it lies in the ethnographer’s recognition that she is positioned 
between two partly incommensurable discourses – the analyst’s world as academic and cultural subject, 
and the understandings, arguments and working presuppositions of the subjects of study – between 
which no resolution or synthesis is possible.iii The lack of synthesis however makes for critical distance 
and inhibits circularity. 
 Ethnographic understanding involves appreciating how people judge and comment on their own 
practices, while simultaneously analyzing the circumstances under which such practices occur, 
employing current academic criteria. This understanding is critical in the strong sense that is not only 
critical of the object of study, but of the practices and categories of the knowing subject, the analyst’s 
own. It is in this encounter that the ethnographer is confronted by the Eurocentrism of her own thinking 
and presuppositions. It follows that, if research is not simply to reiterate hegemony, such cultural 
translation must be dialogic, again in the strong sense that academic presuppositions and practice 
themselves are continually called into question and interrogated through the dialogue.  
 The relevance to Asian scholars and media practitioners should be obvious. With the growth of 
both media industries and media studies across much of Asia, the phase of acquiescing to Euro-
American hegemony requires questioning, if Asians are to appreciate the richness and diversity of 
media practices and production across the continent and allow these to inform their critical thinking.iv 
More specifically, for Indonesians the way that mass communications naturalized a narrow vision of 
  5
development and the polity makes critical engagement with both the media industries and 
communications studies vital if the reform process is to be anything more than empty gesticulation. 
 Even allowing for recognition of media-related practice and the implication of people as subjects 
in the mass media, how can the opinions of a handful of Indonesian villagers matter? What after all, , 
have they to say that could possibly be relevant on such a lofty topic? What I hope to show here is that 
what ordinary viewers have to say requires us to rethink the object of study in communication and 
media research, and so what we are doing in fundamental ways. 
 Such rethinking is, I would argue, overdue. The question is why have so few people challenged 
existing approaches over their manifest Eurocentrism? Unfortunately most scholars are too deeply 
invested in the status quo to wish to cut their own throats. And the studies which claim to make a break 
from this intellectual hegemony (e.g. Shohat & Stam 1994; Curran & Park 2000; Erni & Chua 2005) all 
too often end up, ironically, to paraphrase one title ‘re-westernizing media studies’. The reasons are 
simple. Insofar as what is at issue is only the immediate object of study imagined unproblematically as 
non-Western or Asian media, the theoretical frameworks and goals remain unquestioned. Recognizing 
how hegemonic the epistemological practices of media studies in fact are falters at the next step, 
namely how to step outside this seemingly all-embracing discourse.  
 Even were it desirable, is it possible to avoid Eurocentrism? After all, are the modes of inquiry and 
the academic institutions themselves not inescapably ‘Western’? Implicit in such arguments is an 
elitism which privileges expert and scholarly knowledge and finds it hard, as the old actor above 
remarked, to listen to anyone else. A myopic narcissism is at work, which ignores quite how much and 
how varied what is going on is. For instance, immediately, there is a long history of discussion, 
argument and reflection about Asian media, not least by the media themselves – what I call 
‘intermedia’ commentary.v To dismiss the working practices of those who are ‘organically’ engaged 
(Gramsci 1971), whether as producers, audiences or critics is not just bad manners, it alienates people 
from their own thinking. 
 
Media versus Communications studies 
 How might differences between communications and media studies bear on the kids of issues 
outlined above? What do these differences actually boil down to in different regions of Asia in the 
twenty-first century? What happens if, instead of attempting to explain everything using the old, formal 
dichotomy of theory and methodology, we inquire about differences in intellectual practices and their 
genealogies? 
 For a start, is it possible to rethink the relationship between naturalist or substantialist and critical-
cultural schools of thought, without having to dismiss one as trivial or unimportant?vi What if they are 
different phases of inquiry? The Oxford philosopher, R.G. Collingwood, argued that mathematical or 
empirical and philosophical modes of inquiry are distinct. If you are researching, say, television-
viewing or the ownership of mobile phones, it makes sense in the first instance to assume you can work 
with, and allocate evidence into, distinct classes (what constitutes ownership, viewing, social class, 
occupation, etc.). In short, when you begin to inquire about a phenomenon, you assume that it is 
approachable in terms of discrete and unambiguous categories. You do not worry too much at that 
stage how epistemologically or ontologically justified they are, whether they are a combination of 
popular and scholarly ideas, or how much they are themselves mediated.  
When you have reasonably established what sort of phenomena you are dealing with, a different 
phase of inquiry begins, in which you start to reflect on what it is you have established. This latter, 
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Collingwood called the ‘philosophical’ phase of concepts, where categories overlap and do not permit 
closure. The question then becomes: what significance do the findings have for our broader 
understanding (1933: 26-53)? At this stage new questions arise, such as what are the practices which 
underpin industrial processes of production or how do broad statistical trends in viewing relate to 
individuals and the circumstances of their viewing? Such critical reflection may well lead to asking 
new questions and so a new phase of empirical inquiry. Is this distinction a useful way to consider 
differences between naturalist and critical cultural schools of thought? 
Rephrasing the difference between schools as one of practices of inquiry raises the question of 
what are the implications of adopting one approach rather than another. The differences are at once 
theoretical and practical. In other words, they are what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe called 
‘antagonistic’ (1985: 93-148). Apart from antagonisms arising from differences of class and relations 
of production, other modes of differentiating humans as subjects become pertinent, be they relations of 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, differential positioning with access to knowledge or 
whatever. On this account, by its nature, society does not submit to a single explanation, because it is 
neither a total, nor a coherent, entity (Laclau 1990a.). Insofar as media and communication are social 
activities, the same holds for them. There are always antagonistic explanations of society and social 
action. So, 
antagonism as the negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order, 
and not the moment of a broader totality in relation to which the two poles of the 
antagonism would constitute differential – i.e. objective – partial instances (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 126). 
In reflecting on differences between communications’ and media studies, we shall have to consider the 
limits of each in understanding mass media in contemporary Pacific Asia. 
On my understanding of Laclau and Mouffe, the antagonisms of analytical interest may or may not 
be manifest in explicit conflict. While the New Order strongly discouraged media coverage of a range 
of sensitive topics, notably those dealing with ethnicity, religion, race and interest group or class,vii this 
simultaneous substantialization and avoidance tends to distract attention from the constitutive 
antagonisms. Once recognized, it becomes evident that these were, and are, played out every day right 
across the mass media. For example, the contradictions and incoherencies of masculine authority and 
power are displaced onto women, whether, for instance, as dangerously independent career women or 
cruel step-mothers and mothers-in-law in Indonesian soap operas, or the staple figure of the woman-as-
suffering in cinema.viii Equally striking is the portrayal in television of working class people as ugly, ill-
educated, stupid, instinctual, clumsy and often comical.ix The denials and disarticulation involved are 
remarkable for being so un-remarked on. 
Other aspects of the cultural difficulties in recognizing issues of class and power are evident to 
ordinary viewers like the Balinese villagers mentioned earlier, if not to the media producers. Let us 
consider the main ways in which the polity and models of political relations have been represented on 
television since the 1990s. Briefly we can broadly distinguish two kinds of representations. The first is 
a hierarchical model of social and cosmic division of labour in which different kinds of beings have 
exclusive functions and where power is distributed in complex, often non-manifest ways.x The second 
is what, for lack of a better expression, I shall call democratic capitalist models, different 
interpretations of which underpin the conflict between New Order, secular reformist and moderate 
Islamist visions.  
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These two pairs of paradigms are not simply related as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ models, as both 
have long been invoked in Indonesian political discourse. What each involves depends on who is 
representing it, as what, under what circumstances – which is where the mass media come in. 
Antagonisms arise in at least two different ways. First, in social life humans as social agents are caught 
up in complex and untidy relationships, which are not reducible simply to neat logical structures of 
classes, roles etc. Second, even in the classic case of a worker selling his labour in the market, that does 
not in itself make the capitalist relationships of production intrinsically antagonistic (Laclau 1990b: 9). 
Extrinsic factors, such as a fall in the standard of living in the model of capital or the manifest abuse of 
reciprocal obligations according to the social and cosmic order, bring about antagonisms.xi The latter 
point was clearly stated by the Balinese commentators. The glaring disparities of wealth and life 
choices that daily confront Indonesian television viewers expose the limits of both orders. 
 This brings us finally to the issue of that much over-used term, hegemony. On this account 
hegemony rests upon antagonism. It is how the imbalance between the poles of an antagonism is 
articulated at any moment.  
Hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that it can take 
place only in a field dominated by articulatory practices. This, however, immediately 
poses the problem: who is the articulating subject? (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 134). 
So the social is the product of articulatory practices, notably by the media. Several questions then arise. 
Who, or what, are the agents, instruments and patients (recipients) of these hegemonic articulations? 
How would we set about studying them? What is the role of academics in researching and writing 
about, and so articulating these articulatory practices? And how do the kinds of articulation 
communications studies’ scholars make differ from those of media studies’ scholars? And, finally, 
what is the relationship of academics to the articulating subjects and to the objects of articulation? 
 
Practice versus structure 
Few terms have been used as indiscriminately in the human sciences in recent years as practice. 
The phrase ‘media practices’ falls easily off the lips, but what exactly do those who use it mean by it? 
In the absence of a coherent account of practice as an ontological object, it seems to connote little more 
than disaffection with the formalist vocabulary of structure and process, with perhaps a frisson of 
political radicalism by association with the almost equally problematic Marxist notion of praxis. A 
workable account of practice however might bridge some differences between substantialist and critical 
approaches to media. Practice invites empirical research, but extends to include the intellectual 
practices of the researchers, so making the study critical, in the strong sense above of being reflexively 
critical of both the researcher’s practices and presuppositions. The scope for historical and 
ethnographic study into media-related practices is vast and still largely uncharted. No theoretical notion 
is unproblematic: the shortcomings of ‘practice’ notion will no doubt emerge as critical research gets 
under way. 
 Are existing theories of practice not adequate? What, for instance, of the work of Pierre Bourdieu? 
As Richard Jenkins argues (1992), Bourdieu never addressed the radical ontological or epistemological 
problems, which a more rigorous account of practice would require. Instead he used practice to 
supplement the inadequacies of structure, as a prop to compensate for the more glaring inadequacies of 
notions of system and structure. Bourdieu retained a surprisingly conservative ontology. Consider, for 
instance, what is presupposed in the idea of symbolic capital (a hybrid of a Romantic theory of the sign 
coupled with a deeply contested nineteenth century notion) or the dichotomy implicit in a ‘theory of 
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practice’, 1977.) We have to turn to the work of Foucault to find a serious analysis of practice, with an 
appreciation of the radicality demanded by philosophical pragmatism, in which the pseudo-naturalist 
neutrality of scholar as knowing subject is clearly revealed as an inextricable part of the problem.xii I 
take Foucault’s shift from an archaeological to a genealogical method to be such an attempt (e.g. 
1977b). Foucault was particularly interested in the different modes by which human beings are made 
subjects and are transformed – or transform themselves – through their knowing practices (1982: 208). 
The media, I suggest, are such a mode. And they involve two related sets of practices: those by which 
people change themselves or are changed; and those by which they become objectivized through their 
implication, or engagement, in the media. 
 Rather than talk of ‘media practices’ however, I prefer the expression ‘media-related practices’. It 
may be the residual anthropologist in me, but it is the range of contexts and situations in which media 
become relevant, which seem as interesting as what goes on in the media themselves. Anyway it is hard 
to determine where you would draw the boundary. If housewives cook to have meals ready for the 
family to watch television, or families save up to buy a new set, media conglomerates deciding 
strategies to increase market share or what politicians say – and more importantly do not say – seems to 
me at least as interesting as media practices more narrowly defined.xiii On this account media-related 
practices do not form a closed field: they are incomplete and open. 
How does a concern with practice differ from other ways of conceiving of the object of media 
studies? It is an attempt to break away from a long-standing explanatory dichotomy between structure 
on the one hand and individual agency on the other (replicated, for example, in Giddens’s theory of 
structuration, 1984), as if these were the only alternatives. Instead of the object of inquiry being 
timeless and unsituated, the shift in emphasis is to more historical and anthropological concerns, 
perhaps crudely summed up in such questions as: ‘What happened, and what was presupposed, on 
particular occasions?’ ‘Who represented this as being what, to whom, and under what 
circumstances?’xiv Applied to media, the second pair of questions is significant because, on most 
interpretations, they involve communication and mediation and so take us to issues of the media on the 
media – or ‘intermedia’. Inquiry into practice then assumes some kind of prior inquiry into how mass 
media are conceived and organized, which mass communications is designed to address. However 
recourse to ideas of practice is not simply another stage of inquiry, because in many senses it marks a 
rupture. Theoretically, any serious recourse to practice questions the presuppositions of preceding 
approaches. In the stronger versions, such rethinking is often designated as ‘post-structuralist’.xv 
As the term suggests, such an approach aims to go beyond ideas of structure and its associated 
concepts, whether formal, such as system; or distributional, as in (social) organization; or 
supplementary, as are ideas of process. Socially, structure is not a natural fact. When we describe the 
media in terms of institutions or legal corporations, we are invoking a culturally and historically 
specific genealogy of argument. Similarly, if we are studying, say, patterns of cinema-going in India or 
sampling responses to television programmes in Singapore, as Ian Hacking pointed out (1990), we are 
invoking a kind of fact invented in mid nineteenth-century Europe: the statistical fact or the ‘normal’. If 
we are considering the impact of entertainment media on audiences, then we are assuming some 
account of agency. 
In media and cultural studies, structure stands in an ambivalent relationship to culture, the 
semiotic, or meaning. At one extreme, structure (often linked in some way with the ‘hard’, masculine 
realities of economics and politics) determines, or at least is a good way of explaining, culture (as 
‘soft’, malleable, feminine). At another, culture is the domain of human imagination, through which 
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humans free themselves from, and come to understand the workings of, structure itself. More radically, 
structure stands in opposition to contingency, to the questioning of the predictability or explicability in 
the last resort of what happens (Laclau 1990b). It is the activity of the knowing subject upon the world, 
which creates, or reveals, that structure. So recourse to structure opposes the knower to the known. The 
sort of analysis of practice I am advocating takes issue with all these assumptions. 
Some brief examples from cultural studies may make the point. A feature of the work of the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was the extent to which it enshrined and played 
with, rather than transcended, the dichotomy between cultural voluntarism and structural determination 
(exemplified in Hall 1980). As Chen has pointed out, Cultural Studies has notably failed to address the 
potentially radical dissolution of its constitutive categories by post-structuralism (1996).  
The problems surface in a well known critique of popular culture and cultural populism, 
McGuigan complains of Fiske’s work on television (1987), that he 
says next to nothing about institutional change in television during the 1980s: vital 
issues to do with de-regulation / re-regulation and technology, for instance, are 
simply banished since, for Fiske, they are not pertinent to questions of 
interpretation… 
 Following Bourdieu, Fiske separates ‘the cultural economy’ (symbolic exchange 
between texts and audiences) from ‘the financial economy’ (where the television 
industry is located). Fiske believes it is completely unnecessary to interpret the 
meaning of the former in relation to the commercial operations of the latter… 
 A satisfactory theory of television, I would suggest, needs to account for the 
multi-dimensional interaction of production and consumption at both economic and 
symbolic levels, giving due weight to textual diversity and audience differences, as 
Fiske rights recommends (McGuigan 1992: 71-72). 
The trouble is that McGuigan, in a blast from the past, reinscribes the dichotomy for which he attacks 
Fiske and cheerfully reifies the economic, symbolic, production, consumption, audiences and so on. 
Although McGuigan might seem here to give equal weight to the economic and symbolic, the point of 
the book is to remind readers just how far popular culture is in the grip of powerful and determining 
economic structures. In practice however, commercial interests cannot simply be separated from 
‘content’. And what exactly are scholars doing when they dichotomize the economic and semantic? For 
all their claim to radicalism, most of the protagonists in the debates around cultural studies seem firmly 
entrenched in the metaphysics of a Eurocentric modernism. 
Am, I not just reifying practice in a new set of objects, such as ‘commentary’? I think not. In some 
ways, what I mean by commentary is close to the French discours, the open and unbounded discussion 
that is part of almost any social activity or practice, which became substantialized as ‘discourse’ in 
English-speaking translations. An interesting aspect of recent work on audiences is precisely that it 
does not attempt to essentialize the audience as a natural object. Instead it considers those practices of 
media institutions, governments, academics and others, through which they describe, survey and 
imagine in different ways audiences as different kinds of entities (e.g. Ang 1991, 1996; Hartley 1992, 
1999; Morley 1992; for Indonesia, see Kitley 1998). Equally there are problems in essentializing 
differences between producers, distributors and audiences into bounded compartments. Producers 
regularly meet as audiences to view and judge their own and competitors’ productions. 
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The claims of commentary 
Rethinking the object of media studies as those practices which go on in and around the mass 
media suddenly makes it clear how little we know and how much we still have to investigate. Practice 
is often invoked as a way, as Ien Ang put it, of ‘desperately seeking the audience’. While it is the 
complexities of researching audiences which has attracted the most attention, ethnographic studies of 
how different kinds of media production or distribution actually work, as opposed to how they are 
supposed to work, are proving just as informative and surprising. The research of students of mine, 
who are investigating media production in industries as diverse as magazines, television and news 
production from Jamaica and Kenya to India and Singapore, beautifully illuminates that how producers 
actually work is as exotic, unexpected and interesting as any classic ethnographic study. Because we 
have been so focused on the media as structures and organizations, we have as yet little idea what 
practices may prove significant. 
Among the many practices which make up contemporary mass media, some are reflexive. That is 
they are about the practices themselves. Just as a crucial, indeed constitutive, set of media practices 
frame, represent, modify and articulate events, actions, texts or what have you, these practices 
comment on and articulate these articulatory practices. In this sense they are meta-practices, meaning 
not of some higher order, but simply ones that come after. I shall use ‘commentary’ here as a way in 
singling out those kinds of practice, the constitutive purpose of which is to comment on previous 
practices of articulation. Representation and commentary both supplement and modify what they refer 
to, but to some extent in different ways. As Goodman noted, representing works by eliminating most 
information and by transforming what remains (1968). A picture represents something as something 
else. Commentary expands on or modifies such representations. 
 Why should this framing and reframing be necessary at all? I take it, following Quine (1953, 
1960), that events and actions are underdetermined. That is, for any set of facts, there are a variety of 
ways you can explain, interpret or understand what is going on, each of which make sense of those 
facts, even if in different and incompatible ways. One of the more unnerving experiences of fieldwork 
by participant-observation is that when you have observed something important, you have to rush up 
and ask what you have just witnessed is actually about. Events do not explain themselves. The kinds of 
closure, well described in studies of television production (e.g. Fiske1987), perhaps especially for the 
news (Fiske & Hartley 1978), are ways of determining, what is otherwise non-decidable. Even news 
stories, arguably among the most highly structured of genres, leave themselves open to all sorts of 
possible interpretations. Commentaries often work to restrict the possibility of dissemination. One way 
they do so is by telling you the context or the situation, which is relevant to understand the facts, tell 
you what sort of facts they are, the kind and degree of reliance and the kind of understanding – in other 
words, how to understand them.  
Commentaries do not necessarily over-determine, but may do the opposite. Confronted with a 
definite-looking fact, a commentator may show that things are not what they seem. The trouble with 
determinations is that those who enunciate often do not manage to agree among themselves. 
Is it possible to devise a classification of kinds of commentary, whether of Asian media or of 
media in general? Such an exercise runs the risk of hypostatizing what are analytical and situational 
distinctions. Whether some statement or act is commentative depends on the circumstances of its 
utterance, for whom it is intended and how it is understood. Something similar holds for media ‘texts’ 
more generally. Even Stuart Hall’s argument that it is possible to distinguish ‘dominant-hegemonic’, 
‘negotiated’ and ‘oppositional’ readings of media messages (1980b) presupposes a thorough-going 
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essentialism (Hobart 2005). Anyway, not only are there presumably as many ways of commenting as 
there are ‘illocutionary functions’ (in Searle’s 1971 sense), but presumably commentaries arguably 
may be considered to have multiple functions. Commentary is best left as an analytical notion. 
Re-appraising existing work in terms of commentary already suggests new possibilities. What are 
asking viewers their thoughts on Dallas, or conducting questionnaire surveys about Singaporean TV, if 
not  highly structured invitations to comment? And what are trade journals doing if they are not adding 
authoritative or insiders’ commentary? If you stop and think about it, one of the main activities of the 
mass media is commenting on their own productions and those of other media. The variety is 
surprising. It ranges from the obvious to the less expected. It would include newspaper reviews of films 
and television programmes, the writings of media correspondents, trailers and promotions, trade and in-
house journals and fanzines, films and television programmes about making films and broadcasts, web 
sites for computer and media fans, blogs, chatting about last night’s soap round the coffee machine and 
much else besides.  
 Commentaries are remarkably pervasive. But what we actually know is less the product of 
carefully tailored footage of images and voices than of commentaries. No day goes past without 
politicians, generals and ‘experts’ telling us what is really happening. As we know from the Gulf War 
and subsequent wars, what we see on our television screens is not what took place. As Baudrillard 
noted (1995), images are selected to confer actuality and authenticity upon the commentaries.xvi The 
point also emerges from Fiske and Hartley’s notion of claw-back in news (1978: 86-87), by which eye-
witnesses’ and on-the-spot reporters’ accounts are subordinate to, and structured by, the studio 
presenter’s commentary. One person’s fact is someone-more-powerful’s commentary. So is it 
surprising that, when events are imagined to matter, political commentators – for whom, significantly, 
we use the term ‘pundits’ – hurl themselves into the breach with a self-sacrificing devotion worthy of 
Orientalist imaginings of the Juggernaut? 
Who then is empowered to comment, about what and under what circumstances? What the village 
commentators had to say was marginal to much of communications and media studies, not because of 
what they said (that – later – excited the publishers), but because of who they were or, rather, were not. 
Had they been recognized political commentators (who, under the New Order, were notably quiet), 
they would probably have been hailed for their perspicacity. So what is informed commentary and 
what mere opinion, idle speculation or empty chatter would seem to depend on who says it. No prizes 
for guessing who usually gets left out. 
A point of some significance is that an analysis in terms of practice may fit at least some strands of 
South Asian philosophical thinking rather better than the present options. Certainly critical thinking 
about, and use of, commentary is highly developed. Indian philosophical thinking about the nature of 
language, as exemplified in grammar, translation and commentary, recognizes, as does Balinese, that 
translation presupposes some original to be ‘faithful’ to, which is almost by definition absent. What is 
most significant though is the idea of after-speech, Anuvada, which involves a dialogue with some 
prior text. So elucidation or commentary, vyakarana (kawi: wyakarana) supplements and becomes part 
of the text-as-a-whole.xvii Far from there being some timeless, generic ‘Asian’ mode of thought into 
which we can tap, there seem to have been a host of historically distinct and indeed rival discours, 
ranging from the great written philosophical texts to popular understandings, which are equally 
coherent nonetheless. By concentrating on American and Europe academic thinking, Asian scholars 
may be missing extraordinarily rich and diverse discours in their own various backyards.  
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 Let me now turn to how different kinds of media address themselves to recipients, how they 
imagine and situate themselves as producers and the kinds of commentary in which they are engaged. 
All the materials cited are about Indonesian television. 
 
The limits of commentary 
 Many kinds of commentary are too obvious for me to dwell on at length. Examples are popular 
political commentary in the form of graffiti, pop songs, jokes, rumour, nicknames and a myriad of 
other forms, which abound even under conditions of fairly rigorous censorship. Another is the role of 
retail magazines, which preview and review films and television programmes, and frame production 
and personnel. Film magazines, whether for fans or the general public, have been much more studied 
than television magazines. For example, for three years before it ceased publication in the summer of 
1997, Vista-TV, a fortnightly up-market Indonesian consumer magazine extended itself way beyond 
reviews of programmes to offer a comprehensive critique of state television as ‘the propaganda arm’ of 
the Suharto government and ‘freedom’, which in this instance meant commercial competition. Indeed 
inter-media argument conspicuously includes attempts by the print media to claw back the enunciative 
function from television (film may try something similar, Stokes 2000). There has been a long running 
debate in the Indonesian broadsheets about the pernicious ‘influence’ of television upon the masses 
(Hobart forthcoming). Such commentaries presuppose that the facts are not strong enough to speak for 
themselves, but require further articulation. Attempts to determine how readers and audiences are 
supposed to understand the mass media is only a small aspect of a more complex process. To a greater 
or lesser degree any articulation forecloses the range of possible responses and disarticulates 
alternatives. Commentary may silence as much as it explicates. 
 
Excoriating corruption and staying alive 
In Indonesia theatre has conventionally been a means to social criticism. Even under conditions of 
harsh repression, mutual knowledge of rhetorical forms enabled audiences to understand what actors 
were implying without anything explicit being said. Such theatre often resembles a form of guerrilla 
warfare: the actors have packed up and disappeared, leaving only traces in the memories of audiences. 
When such theatre is televised and so recorded, the stakes are raised.  
 In the summer of 1991, in Bali everyone I knew was talking about a theatre piece held as part of 
the annual International Bali Arts Festival and broadcast on the regional channel of state television. 
The play was a Séndratari, a ‘ballet’ spectacular, performed by a large cast, with an orchestra and 
ranks of singers, a theatre form identifiable with the New Order (Hough 1992). The plot drew on a 
classical episode in the Mahabharata, the ‘Pandawa Asrama’, when the five Pandawa brothers are 
forced into exile in the forest. All the narration and dancers’ voices were articulated by a single dalang, 
or narrator or puppeteer, from one of the two main performing arts’ academies, KOKAR (Konservatori 
Karawitan Indonesia, the Indonesian Conservatory of Music). The dalang, Déwa Madé Sayang, was 
not only a superb performer, but also a trenchant critic of abuses by those in high places. What excited 
those I spoke to was that he had excoriated some of the most senior figures in Indonesia in front of 
television cameras, with two of his targets in the large festival audience. 
 In the story, before the Pandawa brothers are exiled, they meet the sage Bagawan Biasa, who 
advises them how to be good rulers and warns them of the grave consequences for them and their 
subjects of doing otherwise. In 1991, when Déwa Madé Sayang performed this piece, commentary on 
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corruption and abuses of position by the President, his family and government officials was still 
relatively muted, although widely rumoured, despite tight media censorship.  
What Bagawan Biasa said was: 
If you are the leader of a people, if you rule over them, you cannot live too well. You 
must not have too luxurious a life-style, but should live simply. You are such a 
leader. Now none of your subjects should be allowed to be corrupt – that is what you 
must command. But this must be seriously observed in practice. It should not just 
take the form of words: you order the masses to obey, but then it turns out that you 
did not do so yourself. That is the difficulty of becoming a ruler. It is easy to give 
orders; it is hard to put them into practice. That is the first thing to grasp.  
When a ruler is not honest, the world goes to rot. No way may you do that. This is 
what it is to be just. You have to strive to be fair and just to all of your subjects. On 
what do you base fairness? On the Four Kinds of Circumspection: Even-handedness 
(Sama), Discrimination (Béda), Generosity (Dana) and Strictness (Danda). Even-
handedness: you should give to your subjects equally. The Kingdom of Indraprasta 
flourishes – who is responsible? All the subjects, all the officials, are the reason. All 
the armed forces are the reason. Because the ruler treated them all equally. If people 
should perhaps struggle to make a living, give those more – that’s called Sama. 
He then turned to the arts and urged good leaders not to favour one group of artists over another. 
Otherwise those neglected will be angry; gossip will start and the ruler will be discredited. He then 
remarked that generosity and punishment should be judged by worth, not by family or favour. 
 Those I asked agreed that the dalang’s intended targets were President Suharto and his family, and 
also the then Governor of Bali, Ida Bagus Oka, who was widely considered to be very corrupt and to 
have authorized tourist development that was very destructive of the island as a whole. The final target 
was Professor Madé Bandem, the director of the rival arts’ academy (STSI, Sekolah Seni Tari 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Academy of Performing Arts) whom the dalang held accountable for 
hogging invitations for overseas tours. 
 The dalang placed himself here in a complex relationship with his audience. He spoke with great 
enunciative power: with the authority of having mastered the texts, of being qualified to judge their 
relevance to a broad range of circumstances. It was the blast of a modern – but also traditional – 
intellectual, who took his lords and masters, the intellectuals who did their bidding and those in 
opposition who chose to stay quiet, to task for abject failure. Although the speech was understood as a 
searing commentary on the régime, nationally and locally, Déwa Madé Sayang carefully adhered to the 
proprieties of commentary on rulership in ancient India or Bali. At once he condemned a paternalistic 
corrupt régime, yet deferred to the audience as to how they chose to interpret his words.xviii  
I trust it is clear by now why I am reluctant to classify kinds of commentary – or indeed what is 
commentary – because in theatre what is text and what commentary is ambiguous. By contrast to Euro-
American conventions, where the author or performer to assumed to be the agent, Javanese and 
Balinese appreciate the central role of audiences. While actors and puppeteers often draw more or less 
implicit comparisons between situations, problems, moral dilemmas and so forth in performance and 
bring about the juxtaposition, it is members of audiences who draw their own inferences. The 
commentary is the more elegant and effective for being implicit, because each person can decide how it 
applies according to their own circumstances. 
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 But is this commentary? Everyone I spoke to considered it to be. Some drew my attention to an 
aspect I had overlooked. The speech was not simply a complaint, a public voicing. It was targeted at 
officials who were corrupt, had favoured their families and friends, who had failed to be just. The 
expression used was negakin debong, to sit on a wet banana stem: the moisture slowly seeps through 
your clothes until you suddenly realize you are very wet. Any official who retained some vestige of 
humanity, on hearing this speech would be forced to reflect on their actions. According to Balinese 
ideas about meaning (Hobart 1999b), unless a statement has a discernible effect, nothing has happened: 
it has no meaning. Whether what the dalang said is commentary or not depends therefore on whether 
people paid attention and appreciated it. It is audiences who determine what is commentary. 
We seem to have reached a limiting possibility. Commentary cannot be singled out as a 
discriminable class of phenomena – indeed its efficacy in the example above lies both in it not seeming 
to be so and being open to how different people may, or may not, choose to relate to it. Whether 
something is, or is not, commentary turns out to depend upon the occasion, the particular circumstances 
and the relationship between the speaker and different members of the audience. How come this has 
not been more obvious? It is, I suggest, because of the pervasive substantialism that permeates 
communications studies, which leads to serious difficulty in appreciating that we are dealing with ways 
of relating things (practices). Indeed the objects themselves are relational, as the verb ‘to mediate’ 
suggests. Media are directed to something beyond themselvesxix, to the extent that their objects are not 
simulacra (which merely makes things worse, Baudrillard 1983). 
Why then should there be such a bias towards closure around the circumstances of production, 
whether imagined as political-economic determination of content, ideology, a reified ‘text’ or 
‘encoding’ of messages? The short, if not pleasant, answer is that it makes life immeasurably more 
comfortable for scholars. It shores up the cosy myth of the shared superiority of producers and 
academic commentators. Ignoring the extent to which mediation is relational and situational allows 
academics either to dispense with the awkward contingencies of production and reception or to imagine 
themselves as knowing subjects sufficiently universal as to be able in principle to occupy all relevant 
positions of producers and audiences anywhere. To the extent that mass communications scholars are 
functionaries of government and media corporations, this makes a certain sense. To the extent they 
claim to be independent, libertarian or radical, they are fooling no one but themselves. 
If the study of mass media is complicated, untidy, partly contingent and partly unknowable, it is 
not much of an excuse for intellectual myopia and recidivism. That existing approaches are inadequate 
is not a reason for not rethinking what we do. I think it was J.K. Galbraith who once remarked that, 
faced with the overwhelming case for changing your mind and thinking of reasons not to, most people 
immediately start thinking up good reasons. 
 
Just when you thought it was safe to come out 
 If explanatory closure around production and its objects is inadequate, is the study of reception the 
answer? As a comprehensive alternative, the answer is evidently ‘no’, because it commits an equal and 
opposite substantialization. Also reception is the subordinate term in a trichotomy of production: 
distribution: reception. The problems of addressing reception are evident when you consider how 
pervasive the metaphor or synecdoche of ‘consumption’ of mass media has become.xx Because mass 
media are inter alia businesses, it does not follow that every aspect of  it can be explained as a 
business. Or, because for expository purposes it may be helpful to imagine, say, making and 
  15
appreciating television programmes as a process of production and consumption does not mean that it 
is, any more than because it may be illuminating to treat culture as a text; culture therefore is a text. 
 One reason for proposing media-related practices as the object of study is precisely to break away 
from the closure which results from imposing models on complex and underdetermined actions. I 
therefore refer to such practices as a congeries, because they do not, on this account, form a system, but 
are situated, open-ended, labile and changing.  
 
The Governor of Bali awards the prizes 
 My second example is the lead news item from Balivision, a daily English-language broadcast in 
April 1997 by state television in Bali, aimed primarily at tourists but, for intriguing reasons, with a 
large Balinese following. The piece was about the Governor of Bali presiding over the annual 
competition to judge the best ‘Traditional Village’ (the translation of désa adat, itself a hybrid term of 
Dutch colonial ancestry). As was standard for state television, even the Governor did not speak for 
himself but, just as the dalang spoke for the entire cast of the Mahabharata, the event relied on 
voiceover. Here commentary supplanted the original text entirely. As with most scenes of government 
VIPs, the camera followed the movements of the Governor and his entourage as he met (less) important 
people against a backdrop of the well-behaved masses, who exemplified Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’ 
(1977c). 
The commentary was in factual but momentous tone, with the familiar tableau vivant presentation 
that Kitley has noted attended New Order ceremonies (1998). There were extensive details of places 
and people’s names (where the ceremony happened, which villages and actors won), that would have 
been completely meaningless to the intended audience, as would the extended reference to a recondite 
religious categorization.xxi Commentary can articulate black as white and square circles. The 
Governor’s expressed concern about protecting Bali from the ravages of tourism needs to be set against 
television news footage after Suharto’s resignation, when demonstrating university students singled out 
the Governor as the figure primarily responsible for the damage.  
 It is the final line, however, which interests me as it sounds like a direct quote: ‘Participants who 
did not win this time should try to increase their development and capabilities’. This is probably not an 
infelicity in translation.xxii A central plank of the New Order was development, which was to be judged 
in terms of production, production itself being judged primarily quantitatively and being applicable to 
anything. You can – indeed must – have more tradition, traditional villages and capabilities (the 
Indonesian was usually ketrampilan, skills, Balinese being identified synecdochically by their 
legendary skills in the performing and plastic arts) and also increase development and modern skills 
without any contradiction. The incoherencies of the underlying antagonism of the project of 
development are obvious. It is ‘productivism’ gone mad. There is nothing to which it does not apply. It 
was not just the Governor of Bali, but state television, which was caught up in reiterating an 
articulation which was at once absurd and hegemonic. Unfortunately it is not the Governor of Bali who 
is alone in being beguiled by the charms of productivism. I leave it to readers to decide whether their 
intellectual rears are feeling wet or not. 
 
Production versus seduction 
 One of the vocal critics of this festishization of production is Baudrillard, who has opposed 
production to seduction. 
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The bourgeois era dedicated itself to nature and production, things quite foreign and 
even expressly fatal to seduction. And since sexuality arises, as Foucault notes, from 
a process of production (of discourse, speech or desire), it is not surprising that 
seduction has been all the more covered over (1990: 1) 
Seduction, in Baudrillard’s analysis, is emphatically not about sexuality: that articulation was the 
bourgeois means of tainting the idea of seduction, which belongs to a different world. 
Seduction, however, never belongs to the order of nature, but that of artifice – never 
to the order of energy, but that of signs and rituals. This is why all the great systems 
of production and interpretation have not ceased to exclude seduction – to its good 
fortune – from their conceptual field (1990: 2). 
 Seduction is opposed to quantifiability and so to accumulation, power-as-productive and (in a 
sideswipe at Lacan) the real. 
Seduction is stronger than power because it is reversible and mortal, while power, 
like value, seeks to be irreversible, cumulative and immortal… It is the emptiness 
behind, or at the very heart of power and production; it is this emptiness that today 
gives them their last glimmer of reality. Without that which reverses, annuls, and 
seduces them, they would never have had the authority of reality. The real, moreover, 
has never interested anyone. It is a place of disenchantment, a simulacrum of 
accumulation against death (1990: 46). 
Delightfully, even our fascination with structure and systems turns out not to be what it seems. 
Any system that is totally complicit in its own absorption, such that signs no longer 
make sense, will exercise a remarkable power of fascination. Systems fascinate by 
their esotericism, which preserves them from external logics. The absorption of 
anything real by something self-sufficient, and self-destructive, proves fascinating 
(1990: 77). 
And nowhere is this submission to ritual more apparent in the modern world than in television, with its 
repetitive genres and viewing habits. But in the world of media it is in idols and icons, that seduction 
reaches its peak: in the artificial perfection of the sign. 
Undoubtedly the best example of this is to be found in the only important 
constellation of collective seduction produced by modern times, that of film stars or 
cinema idols (1990: 94). 
Baudrillard offers a persuasive account of the limits of production as the dominant order of 
modern bourgeois society. But quite what is seduction all about? Nowhere does Baudrillard define 
seduction, partly of course because definition is an antithetical process to seduction, which stands 
opposed to production as momentary, reversible, weak, fragile and unstable. It is potentially 
revolutionary, as it undermines the dominant orders of society – humour and ridicule being examples. 
It is ritualistic, agonistic, above all linked to artifice, appearances, illusions and the joy of surfaces. 
Here Baudrillard echoes other writers from Foucault’s (1990) scepticism about the claims of 
interpretation as discovering truth in deep foundations to Sontag (1961) in calling for an appreciation of 
things as they appear, which significantly she calls an ‘erotics’. It is no accident that cartoonists and 
comedians are among the first targets of authoritarian régimes.  
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The limits of imagination  
To return to my starting point, the Balinese villagers with whom I have talked over the years about 
television-watching were perceptive commentators on how the mass media worked in Indonesia. They 
were acutely aware of the means by which they were being disarticulated. And they were by turns 
movingly self-critical and detached about how, despite themselves, they could be seduced by television 
and advertisements (Hobart 2001). What ordinary people make of, and do with, mass media tends to 
prove difficult for the over-articulated imaginations of most academics, the very rigorousness of whose 
training makes thinking outside the confines of accepted institutional practice unnecessary, 
inappropriate or downright dangerous. We are facing the limits of reifying production – and, equally, 
distribution and reception – as objects of study.  
Such analyses fail to consider the mass media as practices. A stress on practice – and so 
relationships, because practices by definition relate agents and events – changes our object of study. 
Practice may be the meeting point between empirical and critical approaches because, significantly, it 
includes the practices of media practitioners, audiences and the researchers themselves as part of the 
problem. In so doing it marks a shift from the conventional hierarchy of the knower and her categories 
as being considered superior to those of the known. Film and television producers, let alone audiences, 
across Asia are constantly articulating the world in ways most academics have simply never imagined 
possible, and so have never bothered to inquire about. The result is that they have been deaf to a 
discours going on all around them every day. It would be sadly facile to carry on dismissing it as just 
talk. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i The evening’s discussion is laid out and analyzed at length in Hobart (1999a). For exposition here, I have edited 
the dialogue, which involved three principal speakers. These were an ex-headman of the village where I work, an 
old theatre actor (now in his nineties) and a female actress-dancer in her late twenties and the daughter-in-law of 
the ex-headman. The fact that all three are actors is not coincidental, for reasons which will become apparent.  
This paper was originally presented to an AMIC-SCS-SOAS conference on Media, Practice, Antagonisms: 
Rethinking the Role of Mass Communication Researchers in Asia at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 
11-12th. June 1999. 
My thanks to the anonymous reader for The Asian journal of social science, who made valuable comments on the 
original draft of this article. 
ii The editors of Public culture in Chicago and (then) lone figures like Faye Ginsburg and Debra Spitulnik had 
recognized the importance for anthropology of cultural and media studies respectively. 
iii Such cultural translation applies as much to contemporary media industries as to the remote tribal peoples, with 
which the discipline is associated. The point of Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions was that even natural 
scientists have their own social communities of practice which are not simply reducible to the canons of 
rationality, but are inherently cultural. 
iv The narrowness of mass communications is evident in the failure to recognize historical diversity and cultural 
context. It parallels facile essentializing about Asian media and even ‘Asian values’ (see Chua, B-H 1995) as if 
there were some natural, timeless entity called Asia.  
v Many of the ideas about how radically to rethink media and film studies, including the relevance of intermedia 
commentary, have been worked out over the years with my colleague, Ron Inden. 
vi The kind of realism and pseudo-empiricism widely found in mass communication studies is a version of 
philosophical substantialism; see Collingwood 1946: 42-45. 
vii Media coverage of ‘a range of topics are widely recognised as off limits, and have been dubbed with the 
mnemonic  “miss sara” which refers to anything deemed seditious, insinuating, sensational, speculative, or likely 
to antagonise ethnic, religious, racial or “group” (class) tensions’ (Hill 1994: 45), cited in Fox n.d. 
viii As elsewhere, much concern is invested in the sexuality of women. For film Sen (1982) addresses the way 
women are portrayed as dependent and sinful, while Heider (1991) notes how social and domestic conflicts are 
resolved through the physical or emotional suffering of the women involved. 
ix The exception is the series SiDoel Anak Sekolahan, Si Doel the educated. Derived from a popular film, the hero, 
played by the original boy actor makes it through the educational system, but decides to quit, to drive a jitney bus 
and return home, where he is surrounded by the usual caricatures of the Indonesian poor. That this series 
consistently scored top ratings, yet none of the television companies got the point and decided to portray the 
struggles of able working class people is telling. 
x Sometimes this differential order is summed up as (H)adat, on which the classical reference is Schärer (1963). 
Since the end of the New Order, magazines and television programmes devoted to ‘mysticism’ have burgeoned. 
Dismissed by secular rationalist and Islamists alike as dangerous and reactionary, I would argue that these are 
popular ways of questioning the dominant political and religious movements which continue to disarticulate 
ordinary Indonesians by referring to alternative ways of understanding power and human motivation. 
xi There is therefore always a constitutive outside inherent in any antagonistic relationship (Laclau 1990a: 9). The 
notion of a constitutive outside, which Laclau derives from Henry Staten’s (1986) reading of Derrida, turns out to 
be a flexible and powerful means of analyzing antagonisms, which are sutured over, notably in the mass media.  
xii  Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it is local and 
regional…not totalizing. This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and 
undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to ‘awaken consciousness’ that 
we struggle (the masses have been aware for some time that consciousness is a form of knowledge; 
and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to 
take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their 
illumination from a safe distance. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle (Foucault 1977a: 
208). 
Foucault was then clear that an analysis based on practice upset the cosy relationship of intellectuals with their 
object of study, the implications of which communication and media studies needs urgently to take account. 
xiii I take practice to be a recognized set of actions which affects the world or agents, or commonly both in differing 
degree and kind. Activities I consider to be congeries of actions in which people engage either less formally or 
where not much is changed by doing so. Sitting university finals exams and going fishing are examples of a 
practice and an activity respectively. As we shall see, under what circumstances commentary is a practice as 
against an activity, may be crucial. My usage is consonant with the main senses of practice in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
xiv ‘Who’ here questions the kind of agent, which may well not be an individual person, but a complex and 
changing grouping (Hobart 1990) 
xv I carefully avoid describing such critical thinking as ‘postmodernist’, for reasons outlined, for instance, by 
Baudrillard (1993). 
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xvi Baudrillard’s argument in The precession of simulacra is about questioning what determines the relationship 
between image and reality (1983: 11). 
xvii I  am indebted to an essay, which I unfortunately no longer have, by Adiya Dev Sood, a student of Ron Inden, 
which provides an elegant analysis of how we would have to rethink our assumptions about language use were we 
to take Indian writings on language philosophy seriously. 
xviii I am not guessing on these points. In discussions, Déwa Madé Sayang was quite explicit about the dangerous 
task that had been placed on the shoulders of actors, by the failure of other intellectuals and media figures to stand 
up to tyranny. He was also clear that it was up to individual members of the audience to understand the characters’ 
words as they saw fit. 
xix The philosophical approach here is pragmatist, as C.S Peirce’s analysis of relations of relations makes clear. 
Actions and practice are directed. That is they are directed towards bringing about a state of affairs, which is not 
already, or entirely, the case. They are directed to an end outside themselves and so are contingent. The media 
appear to be the opposite, in that they mediate pre-existing entities. A moment’s reflection suggests though that 
mediation transforms what it mediates and so is one kind of practice. 
xx The opposition of mass culture and high art sneaks in here. We are happy to talk about consuming television, 
game shows or whatever, but to say you went to the theatre to consume King Lear or the Ramayana sounds odd. 
xxi The voiceover read: 
Yesterday Bali Governor Ida Bagus Oka presented an award to the winner of the Traditional Bali 
Competition for 1996-1997 at Wantilan Taman Ayun, Badung. First place went to the Mengwi 
Traditional Village, sub-district of Mengwi, Badung Regency. They received an award and cash 
totalling Rp. 4,500,000. In second place was Tegallinggah Traditional Village at Bedaulu, Gianyar and 
third place was taken by Betanja, sub-district of South Denpasar. 
The Wayang-Arja Parade Competition was also held. First place went to I Nyman Sudana, a puppeteer 
from Badung Regency; second to I Wayan Karsa from Bangli; and third place to Déwa Putu Banjar 
from Gianyar Regency. The Governor said that we have to protect the negative impact of tourism by 
maintaing our customs through Traditional Villages and the Tri Hita Karana concepts, which include 
pahyangan, pawongan and paumahan.  He added that participants who did not win this time should try 
to increase their development and capabilities. 
Briefly, the Tri Hita Karana comprises the three elements of Divinity as all-pervasive, which make possible the 
emergence of good in this world, in spirit, thought and body. This was one of many formalizations necessary for 
Balinese to meet the criteria for an accepted religion under the New Order. 
xxii For other examples and an extended analysis, see Hobart 2000. 
